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FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0094
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2381
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2401
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0340
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0723
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1043

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 001513

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FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [UNSC](#) [BM](#) [MY](#)
SUBJECT: BURMA: MALAYSIA RECEIVES DEMARCHE ON ASEAN
LEADERSHIP AND POSSIBLE ENVOY

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1484 - WAITING ON GAMBARI

- [1](#)B. STATE 137644 - KEEPING PRESSURE ON THE REGIME
- [1](#)C. KUALA LUMPUR 1476 - UMNO YOUTH PROTEST
- [1](#)D. KUALA LUMPUR 1470 - CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT FAILED
- [1](#)E. KUALA LUMPUR 1386 - NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ON UNSC ROLE
- [1](#)F. KUALA LUMPUR 1375 - AMB'S FAREWELL CALL ON FM

Classified By: Charge David B. Shear for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

[1](#)1. (C) Charge delivered ref A demarche on October 11 to Malaysian Foreign Ministry Secretary General Rastam Mohamed Isa. Charge expressed appreciation for Foreign Minister Syed Hamid's statements October 7 urging the Burmese regime to begin a dialogue without preconditions with ASSK and the pro-democracy opposition. Charge asked for Malaysia's reaction to Gambari's October 5 statement before the UNSC. Rastam confessed that he had not seen the Gambari statement, but he expected that it was in line with the briefing Gambari provided to Malaysia's UN Permanent Representative in New York. Rastam expressed keen interest in the outcome of the current deliberations over a UNSC President's statement.

[1](#)2. (C) Charge said he had been instructed to seek Malaysia's reaction to the possibility of ASEAN appointing a special envoy to Burma. Such an envoy would support Gambari's mission; reinforce ASEAN's strong interest in resolving Burma's current problems; and provide a means for ASEAN to engage both China and India in support of positive change in Burma. The SecGen responded that the idea of a special envoy was one Malaysia could consider, but it would need to be discussed with ASEAN. Rastam hinted that ASEAN had already heard of the proposal but offered no thoughts on how the group might have taken it up. How ASEAN would do it and when would be important questions, he said.

[1](#)3. (C) Rastam added that ASEAN would need to weigh Burma's reaction to the special envoy proposal, noting that Burma was in the process of dealing with Gambari. This appeared to be having some success, and there was a need to let Gambari do his job, Rastam commented. Malaysia and ASEAN strongly supported Gambari, and ASEAN would need to see what comes next for the UN envoy's mission. Rastam refused to comment on whatever deliberations ASEAN countries may be having with regard to addressing the Burma issue in the November ASEAN Summit.

[1](#)4. (C) Comment: Rastam's initial reaction was not enthusiastic. The concept of an ASEAN special envoy for Burma will immediately rekindle in Malaysian minds memories

of Foreign Minister Hamid's bitter experience in trying to carry out a somewhat similar role in early 2006. The extent to which other ASEAN members support and take ownership of the special envoy concept will be more important to the Malaysians than future U.S. endorsement.

SHEAR